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BOOK REVIEWS
CRIM

AND THE CRIMINAL

LAW. By Barbara Wootton. London: Stevens &

Sons, 1963. Pp. i-viii, 1-118.
Lady Barbara Wootton's small book is a printed version of the fifteenth
series of Hamlyn Lectures, delivered in November, 1963, at Sheffield University
in England. The lectures present a sustained argument for the proposition that
the criminal law should abandon the aim of imposing punishments on the
wicked in preference for an aim of defending society against harmful acts.
Lady Barbara begins her argument with the observation that the causes
of crime are of great variety. "Criminals" and "delinquents" do not constitute
a single category of human beings. She argues that researches into the causes
of crime or delinquency have been so unproductive because, in general, they
have been undertaken on the assumption that an identifiable criminal class
exists whose characteristics can be uncovered by the appropriate research tools.
The most interesting researches, she points out, "have given insight into the
endless variety of a particular category of crime or of a particular group of
offenders."' As research becomes more specific it "will uncover more and more
recognizable and recurring patterns, in which particular types of persons are
found to commit particular types of crime in particular circumstances." 2
In her second lecture, Lady Barbara attacks the present-day punitive
conception animating the criminal law and the criminal courts. She believes
that it is profoundly wrong to assume that the infliction of punishment is the
best way to prevent the occurrence of prohibitive acts. Yet the "continual failure
of a mainly punitive system to diminish the volume of crime strongly suggests
that... [such an opinion] is illusory. ' 3 She calls attention to a perceptible shift
away from the traditional view by pointing, to the growing number of strict
liability crimes. The movement does not distress her. If the primary function
of courts and the criminal law is to prevent the commission of harmful acts,
there is "little cause to be disturbed by the multiplicity of offenses of strict
liability. ' 4 Harm has been done; motivation is irrelevant except on the issue
of treatment.
The third lecture addresses itself to the problem of the mentally abnormal
offender. A criminal law oriented toward the social defense would not attempt
to assess the responsibility of people who perform harmful acts. First of all
Lady Barbara argues that it is impossible to determine whether an offender
possesses -the ability to have acted otherwise than as he did. Again the fact of
mental illness is important for purposes of treatment but not for purposes of
adjudicating guilt.
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The final lecture is addressed to a discussion of sentencing policy as it
would operate in a preventive system. The object of the sentence would be -to
take "the minimum action which offers an adequate prospect of preventing
future offenses.5 Such a text might commend itself to Jeremy Bentham, but
Lady Barbara would employ the formula quite differently. She admits that
there may be a deterrent effect to sentencing, but she asserts that its precise
impact cannot be measured. Therefore, on practical grounds, priority must
be given in the choice of sentence "to the likely effect of a particular decision
upon the offender himself." 6 She would not, however, turn the convicted persons
over to psychiatrists for assessment as individuals. "Fundamentally, the job is
statistical, not psychiatric." 7 The indeterminate sentence should be generally
used with release to depend upon the offender's "progress" judged by an administrative authority. The authority would accumulate statistical material
respecting all sorts of offenders and situations so that releases could be made
on the basis of fact. For the moment at least, she would leave the power to fix
maximum limits of detention with the courts. The present state of knowledge
does not permit the full employment of statistical methodology. A safeguard
would be added by providing. that determinations respecting detention and
release should not be made by an "invisible office," but only by an office having
face to face contact with the people concerned.
In summary, the heterogeneity of crimes and criminals argue for individualization in penal treatment. So also, as Lady Barbara sees it, does the proliferation
of strict liability offenses and the refinements of notions of responsibility.
That treatment ought to be individualized is a proposition commanding
almost universal assent in the twentieth century. Yet it is unlikely that such
an aim will ever be pursued without regard to other values. A case can be made
that a great many murderers present no problem of recidivism whatsoever. Even
on the assumption that such one-time killers c6uld be identified by statistical
techniques, it is unlikely that they would be returned to society with little or
no punitive action. No system of criminal law which is likely to exist will
fail to reassure the community by taking drastic steps against those who intentionally perform acts of great harm.
Lady Barbara herself is, I believe, unwilling to embrace strict liability in
every context. She distinguishes between the question, "Who broke the window?'
and the question, "Could the man who broke the window have prevented himin
self from doing so?" 8 The second question she finds unanswerable. The first
is an important question. A criminal liability should be "agential," a derivation
from the word "agent." An "agential" foundation for criminal law would surely
provide a defense of mistake of fact. If such is not the case, one would wonder
why 'the authorship of an act" is important in the assessment of criminal
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liability. If it is vital to discover who is the "agent," it is also important to
discover what the "agent" thought he was doing. If his facts were wrong and
if he were not negligent in accumulating his facts, it is difficult to see the
purpose of imposing criminal responsibility on him.
If Lady Barbara seriously proposes a system which would make criminal
the acts of a person who does not understand what he is doing as well as one
who does understand, simply because a great harm has come from their respective acts, she makes a proposal which no civilized society has accepted except
in limited fields where the penalties are light or where the instances of injustices
have been so few that public attention has not been devoted to the problem.
A fundamental point with which Lady Barbara would disagree is this: it
is desirable to reserve criminal sanctions for society's response to those acts
which are most dangerous or abhorrent to the community. The adjudication
itself does and ought to carry with it a serious stigma. It would be a mistake
of the first order to attempt the substitution of another system which would
merely ask, "who possesses the body that caused these acts," which would
then adjudicate the "actor" as a criminal and proceed to provide the "treatment" required to make certain the "actor" was no longer "dangerous." If the
attempt were successful, repeal would be swift, assuming the people were yet
free to ask for justice.
MONRAD G. PAULSEN,
Professor of Law
Columbia University
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THE LAW PRACTISE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

It is to be hoped that the eye of the reader as it touches the title of this
volume will not instantly speed on to works of more immediate professional concern. For the publication of the first of two volumes of the legal papers of Alexander Hamilton is an event which deserves the attention of imaginative members
of the bar as well as legal historians. Published under the auspices of the William
Nelson Crowell Foundation, this important undertaking is edited by Julius
Goebel Jr., Professor Emeritus of Legal History at the School of Law, Columbia
University. Separate from but related naturally to the new edition of the Hamilton papers currently being published by Columbia, this volume makes a distinct
and distinguished contribution to our knowledge of Alexander Hamilton and to
our comprehension of the development of American law.
It is only by unusual good fortune that so many of the legal papers of
Hamilton have survived the years. A wide variety of documents gathered from
the Hamilton papers at the Library of Congress, from various repositories of
564

